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Observing the Elections
inCentral NepaP
Judith Pettigrew
Early one morning in September 2004, I overheard a whispered conver-
sation between my neighbour, who Iwill call Thagu ' (,eldest son' in
Tarnu Kwi, the Gurung language), and my village sister. Thagu
whispered,
They arrived when it was raining and sheltered in our house
for about an hour. They have gone now but they say that they
will he back in the evening with their friends. They have left
their packs on the veranda. What should I do"? I want to move
them in case the army arrives, because if they find them we will
be killed, but I am terrified that they contain bombs which
might explode if they are moved.
So began what Thagu described to me as 'the longest and worst day of
my life'. The army did not arri ve, the bags did not explode, and the
young Maoist women who deposited them, returned in the evening to
collect them. Later. Thagu commented, 'I have never been pleased to see
the Maoists, I do not support their ideas, and do not like them frightening
The Social Science Baha discussion that this paper was originally presented at grew
out of a conversation between Sara Shneiderman and me. 1would like to thank Sara
for helping to organise the event and the Social Science Baha for hosting it.
2 All personal names in this piece arc pseudonyms except for names already in the
public domain.
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and threatening us, but that day I was happy when they re-appeared and
removed their bags.'
On election day in April 2008, I arrived at the polling booth at 6.50
am just before it opened. I decided to introduce myself to the polling
officers, who were strangers to the village and did not know me. As I
walked across to meet them, I greeted the representatives from the dif-
ferent parties: three from the Maoists, three from the UML, three from
the Nepali Congress, and a single representative each from the smaller
parties, The majority were Tamu (Gurung), a small number were Bahun.
and one was a Dalit representing the Maoists. Many were people I had
known since I began my research in the village almost eighteen years ago
in 1990. These people are first and foremost fellow villagers with multi-
ple ties and interrelationships that pre-date the elections and will con-
tinue after them. They are people who are related to each other, who are
friends, acquaintances, adversaries and colleagues. Some sit together on
various village committees, some work together, but on that day they were
positioned in very different camps. The previous evening they had met and
agreed to cooperate so that polling would run smoothly. I spoke to the
Congress workers first, and then to the Maoists-the lama's son and a
tailor stood alongside their third representative ... my neighbour, Thagu.
By 7.30 am, it was obvious that Thagu was not the only villager who
was impressed by the CPN (Maoist). Although some people spoke of the
former insurgents in whispers, the Maoist group outside the polling booth
was impressively large, and included Tamu ex-British soldiers, relatively
well-offfarmers, older Dalit men, middle-aged Bahun women, and Tamu
and Chhetri youth. The Nepali Congress and UML groups were also
large but less diverse. The Congress group, in particular, included large
numbers of middle-income, middle-aged and elderly Tamus and was
more homogenous than those of the other parties.
Kwei Nasa
The village, which I will refer to as Kwei Nasa (a Tamu Kwi pseudo-
nym) is in Constituency No. 1 of Kaski District and was previously a
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Congress stronghold (the immediate past incumbent was Taranath
Ranabhat, speaker of the last House of Representatives). In 2008, Dev
Gurung;' who had spent a night in the village some weeks prior to the
election, won the seat for the CPN (Maoist).
Kwei Nasa consists of several hundred households located along the
upper slopes and top of a ridge in the mid-hills of central Nepal. It has a
health post, rice mill, teashops that serve as general-purpose stores, and a
kerosene distribution centre, but it has no electricity. Tamu people founded
Kwei Nasa, and they continue to be in the majority, but about 20 per cent
of the population is Dalit. The outlying hamlets are home to other ethnic
groups (Tamang and Magar) as well as Bahuns and Chhetris. Many vil-
lagers have relatives in foreign armies (British and Indian) or working
overseas, and remittances make a significant contribution to the local
economy.
I lived in Kwei Nasa from late 1990 to early 1993 and have re-visited
ever since on an annual basis. Starting in 2000 and particularly from
2002 onwards I returned to the village three to four times each year to
chart the course of the insurgency in the area. I undertook research dur-
ing all phases of the insurgency, including the two states of emergency,
active phases of fighting, ceasefires and in the post-conflict period.
Chronology of the insurgency in Kwei Nasa
To contextualise the events of the 2008 election, the following section
provides a brief chronology of events during the insurgency in Kwei Nasa.
Maoists became active in the village in the late 1990s. Initially, they
made speeches, gave cultural performances and asked for financial dona-
tions and guns. Their presence increased when a training camp opened in
the forest above a neighbouring village. While most Maoists were not
local, there were Maoist activists in nearby predominantly Bahun ham-
lets which had families with long histories of left-wing activism. There
3 Gurung also successfully contested a seat in his home district of Manang. He has
chosen to represent his home constituency and not Kaski 1.Re-polling in Kaski 1 is
scheduled for early 2009.
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were also Maoist sympathisers in Kwei Nasa, although the degree of
sympathy was difficult to gauge, especially once the conflict escalated.
The majority of villagers, however, were non-aligned.
With the arrival of the Maoists, these villagers feared the implications
of the changed political situation. Some people worried that pre-existing
conflicts would become superimposed onto Maoist agendas, and this pe-
riod marked the beginning of conflict-related suspicion of intimates.
People's imaginations were fed by stories of what had happened else-
where, and what they feared might happen in Kwei Nasa.
The security situation changed markedly with the escalation of the
insurgency in 2001 and the imposition of a state of emergency. The
Maoists went underground and the Royal Nepalese Army was actively
engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign. Non-aligned villagers were
deeply fearful of being accused by the Maoists of acting as army spies,
and of being viewed as Maoists by the army. People feared the Maoists
but they were much more frightened of the army which remained aloof.
In the violent aftermath of a soldier's killing in a nearby village, the
army visited Kwei Nasa by helicopter, set up camp and conducted an
indiscriminate and at times brutal search-and-cordon operation in the
area. Non-aligned civilians from neighbouring villages were killed and
some Kwei Nasa villagers were briefly interrogated. In addition to the
relatively frequent visits of the army, there was a continuous Maoist
presence in the village, partly because a locally popular senior leader was
from an adjoining hamlet.
During this period, there were many Maoist actions. A teacher was
publicly humiliated for criticising the insurgents and out-of-village workers
were beaten because the Maoists thought they were criminals. The staff
of the Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) were intimidated,
then forced to stop their activities, and finally chased out of the village
by the Maoists."
Although there were threats and intimidations, people appreciated
4 This was because ACAP was under the umbrella of an organisation that had royal
patronage.
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aspects of the Maoists' approach. Unlike the soldiers, villagers could talk
and reason with the Maoists and thereby exert some influence. Mass
meetings were informative as policy was explained and while their ac-
tions might not be supported, people could understand the basis on which
their decisions were made. It was a complex co-existence.
Between 2003 and 2006, the village was under de facto Maoist con-
trol. The army visited rarely but the Maoist culture of surveillance pen-
etrated deeply. Villagers supported and betrayed each other and people's
fear focused on who was an insider and who an outsider.
In 2004, the area was under the control of a detached and punitive
Tamu commander (political commissar) named litendra after the popu-
lar local commander, Moti Lal, a Bahun, had been killed. Moti Lal was
seen as fair, non-punitive and people believed that he protected them and
they worried about his death which eventually came. In late 2004, litendra
banned meetings held by the ACAP-formed committees. The commit-
tees were disbanded and the members had to resign. This made the man-
agement of the day-care centre and other development activities such as
conservation of the forest more complicated. litendra stated that things
could be run 'in the traditional manner', leaving it up to locals to inter-
pret this. No one was sure what exactly this meant but it seemed that
while ad hoc 'committee' meetings could be held, the bureaucracy relat-
ing to the formal committees such as minute-taking, official scheduling
of meetings in designated buildings, etc, was to cease.
In late 2005, Maoists arrived at the home of Chandra Bahadur, a 33-
year-old social activist, Nepali Congress member and local leader. The
Maoists told him that he had to attend a meeting of the Tamu Mukti
Morcha (Tamu Liberation Front) in Khoda, a village aday's walk away.
When he arrived at Khoda, he discovered that local leaders from all
across the area had been assembled. In front of thousands of people,
Chandra Bahadur was garlanded as a member of the Tamu Mukti Morcha
central committee along with 11other unsuspecting local leaders. Deeply
taken aback, Chandra Bahadur asked if he could resign. He stated that he
would help informally, but did not want to be an official member of the
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front. The event at Khoda was broadcast on radio, his name was men-
tioned, and he had to report to the army to explain what had happened.
Chandra Bahadur relocated to the city and did not return until the cease-
fire of mid-2006.
Post-conflict
The conflict ended in 2006 and by the end of the year, most people had
recovered from the effects of chronic fear and recreated their lives. Some
people 'came out' as Maoists while others joined the party. The evalua-
tion of the Maoists during the insurgency was overwhelmingly negative
and some found it difficult to acknowledge their affiliation. Membership
of the party remains a sensitive topic and even those who have openly
joined discuss their participation somewhat circumspectly. 5
Across the country and especially in the rural areas which bore the
brunt of the insurgency, there are specific local processes, events, rea-
sons and calculations which led people to vote the way they did. In the
following section, I examine the role played by changes in Maoist-vil-
lager interrelationships and the process of 'forgetting fear' .
Maoist-villager interrelationships
The visit of the PIA
In mid-2006. between 200 and 300 members of the PLA (the Maoists'
People's Liberation Army) spent a month in Kwei Nasa undergoing train-
ing. As they were no longer underground, many villagers had lengthy
conversations with them without fear of repercussions. Later that year, a
31-year-old woman explained how her ideas about the Maoists had
changed following this visit. She said,
5 Those who have joined the Maoist movement are viewed by many people with a
mixture of bemusement, suspicion and exasperation. Some family members have
vocally criticised decisions by their kin to join the party. When Iinterviewed a new
ePN (Maoist) party member in July 2008, he assumed that I was going to tell him
off!
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In the past if I heard their name, I was frightened. I thought,
'What type of people are they? ..who carried guns, killed peo-
ple, and terrorised the village.' They brought a particular type
of fear. Now there is no fear. We can move around... Ican talk
openly with the Maoists. 1 have discovered that the Maoists
are people just like us.
My neighbour, Thagu, and his family hosted a group of cadres and he
spent many hours in their company. Thagu is a thoughtful man who has
worked as a labourer in Dubai, India and Malaysia, and previously he
had been rather annoyed with the Maoists. When they arrived, demand-
ing food and shelter, he sometimes said to them, 'Why should I look
after you? Am I your wife that I should feed you and cook for you? We
hardly have enough for our own family. 'C,
During their month-long stay, however, he saw another side and be-
came especially close to a young man who had been shot eight times in
the head. The female cadres impressed him as they talked about the free-
dom they had gained among the Maoists in contrast to the constraints of
their previous lives.
Most importantly, Thagu was impressed by the Maoists' commit-
ment to rural Nepal. He is exasperated with the lack of development in
the village. Although the village is-since the opening of a road in the
last few years to the base of the ridge on which lies Kwei Nasa-less than
half a day away from Pokhara, it has no electricity and can only be
reached on foot after a long steep climb. Thagu is also frustrated with the
undevelopment of agriculture, the poor educational and health facilities
and the general marginalisation of rural areas. He is not wealthy enough
to relocate to the city, and even if he were, he does not want to join the
never-ending Tamu urban exodus. He wants to live in his village, farm
and raise his four children. The Maoists are the only people who have
seriously engaged Thagu and, without their guns, he hopes that they
6 I am grateful to my colleague Alpa Shah for this quote which formed part of a
conversation she had with Thagu in March 2008.
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offer the possibility of a better life for him and his family.'
Kinship ties are an important consideration in an analysis of voting
patterns in Nepal and the Congress party workers I spoke to in March
2008 assumed that these would continue to work to their advantage. Thagu,
however, is an example of the breaking up of these ties as he comes from
a 'Congress family'. Kinship may be crucial to understanding local vot-
ing patterns but equally important in the election of April 2008 was the
dissolution of those long-standing ties.
It took Thagu some time to 'come out' as a Maoist. He confided in
me in early March that he was a party member but at that time not many
people knew of his affiliation. He is very aware that people in the village
suffered during the insurgency and while much of this related to the fear
of being caught between the 'fires' of the opposing armies, it also con-
cerned the specific hardship caused by the constant presence and behav-
iour of the Maoists.
Following the signing of the peace agreement the mystique that sur-
rounded the insurgents was shattered. For the first time in years, it was
possible to talk openly with them without the danger of repercussions.
People who were used to thinking of the Maoists as the 'other' began to
find that they were surprisingly like themselves. In late 2006, a woman
in her early thirties commented, 'Before, I was frightened of both the
Maoists and the army ... If we did not provide food and accommodation
they could become angry ... Now, there is no fear because now we know
that the Maoists are also people like us.' What is different is that they can
interact with Maoists largely without fear of violence. The social rela-
tions are balanced in a way that they were not during the insurgency.
During 2006 and 2007, Maoist actions continued and, at the request
of the family, there was a re-investigation (by the Maoists) into the death
7 There are multiple motivations for joining the Maoists. Thagu states that he is
ideologically motivated. Others also emphasised his ideological commitment and
his hopes for the future. While not diminishing these motivating factors, his mem-
bership of the CPN (Maoist) may also be an attempt to further his political ambition.
This requires additional investigation.
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of a village man some years previously. This led to some arrests and the
brief abduction of a suspect by the Maoists. It was during this period that
I started seeing Maoist mobilisers working openly in the village. In De-
cember 2006, I interviewed a grey-suited young woman, a member of a
prominent local Maoist family, who was enthusiastically attempting to
engage village women in Maoist programmes. As we spoke, a group of
villagers gathered, some eyed her suspiciously and protectively wrapped
themselves in their shawls while others looked with interest at her publica-
tions and listened intently to her stories of grenades that did not explode
and the hardships of sentry duty. The demystification of the Maoists was
firmly underway and a new type of interrelationship was developing.
'Forgetting fear ,
A degree of intimidation remained but people no longer feared the Mao-
ists (or the security forces) and although they remembered the hardship
of the conflict, they had made choices. 'Forgetting fear' was a coping
strategy that allowed villagers to put the past behind them. After years of
conflict, people desperately wanted peace and this meant actively engag-
ing with those who had previously frightened them. People were willing
to forget, s and violence was just one component of the Maoist picture. It
was not the single defining feature.
Conclusion
Why did previously non-aligned and often fearful villagers vote for (and
in some cases join) the Maoists in Kwei Nasa?
First of all, many people did not vote for them. On Election Day, I
sat in the middle of a crowd of villagers. Some of my companions whis-
pered tensely when a Young Communist League (YCL)9 group appeared,
8 This is not the case for people who were deeply traumatised. People interviewed in
other villages, and who were injured in crossfires and traumatised, re-experienced
fear each day.
9 The YCL is the youth wing of the CPN (Maoist). The organisation was formed!
revived in January 2007 just before the Maoists joined the interim parliament. They
have a reputation for intimidation and many people are fearful of them.
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and when they had left, they told me that because of past violence and the
threat of violence they were not voting for the former insurgents. 10
Nevertheless, many people in Kwei Nasa did vote for the Maoists.
What factors prompted them to do so?
Clearly, the month-long 2006 visit by the PLA was important. It
allowed villagers to develop a new type of relationship with the Maoists.
Many people liked what they saw. Thagu, for example, was inspired by
the Maoist's commitment to rural areas and their promise of a new inclu-
sive Nepal. Without their guns (and in conjunction with the 'forgetting
of fear') the Maoists were an appealing option.
This is a predominantly Tamu area and the constituency was won by
Dev Gurung, a Tamu and a prominent Maoist, a 'local boy made good'
(not entirely 'local' as he is from nearby Manang district but 'local'
enough). Many people told me that Dev Gurung has benefitted from
mentoring, training and opportunities in the CPN (Maoist). The advance-
ment of a Tamu to the highest echelons of the Maoist party, and his
fielding as a candidate illustrated the party's commitment to the janajiiti,
(the broad grouping of Nepal's ethnic groups that includes the Tamu).
This was an important motivating factor and especially for youth who
acutely experience the lack of opportunities.
The Maoist agenda also appealed to Dalits from Kwei Nasa. Dau
Bahadur, the Maoist polling booth representative, like Thagu, had worked
overseas as a migrant labourer. In July 2008, he told me that this experi-
ence had provided him with alternative models of social interrelationships.
When the conflict ended, he readily joined the Maoists, using the move-
ment as a platform to advance Dalit tights. As a locally prominent party
member, he has moved the agenda of Kwei Nasa's Dalits into the political
centre stage for the first time. In July 2008, he was raising funds to build
10 Although some people felt intimidated when the YCL briefly appeared, voting in
Kwei Nasa took place in an atmosphere that was, as far as I could ascertain, free of
intimidation. There was a brief but heated argument between representatives of the
Nepali Congress and the CPN (Maoist) mid-afternoon when the former accused the
latter of encouraging proxy voting, but otherwise the poll was conducted peacefully.
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the firstpublic toilet for use by Dalits in the village andplanning an upcoming
visit to the party headquarters in Kathmandu. In November 2008, he was
elected to the committee of a newly formed village-wide social develop-
ment project.
The Maoists were the only party to seriously mobilise villagers. From
the ceasefire onwards, they attempted to actively engage villagers. They
had the advantage in that they were already 'in the field' but no other
party made a serious attempt to rival them. Kwei Nasa had previously
been a Congress stronghold and party activists assumed that it would be
again. In a serious miscalculation, they anticipated that history, pre-ex-
isting loyalties and kinship ties would reconfigure as usual. Candidates
made belated and half-hearted visits but it was too late and too little.
Local party members also misjudged the changed atmosphere. Nepali
Congress activist Chandra Bahadur stated confidently inMarch 2008 that
'Congress will win in this village, this is a Congress village'. Many peo-
ple did vote Congress, but not enough.
Much of the post-election analysis suggests that people were willing
to give the Maoists a chance. They were exasperated with the ineptitude
of the other political parties and felt abandoned by them. They were
willing to try the untested. The Maoists might be untested in the formal
national political arena but they were not entirely untested. The insur-
gency was rural-based and people have co-existed with them for years.
They observed the Maoists fight a war, run a parallel government, de-
velop an effective surveillance network, move huge numbers of people
across the country, attempt reforms and so on. They have watched them
do many of these things very successfully. When compared with the
repeated failures of the other political parties it is hardly surprising that
they are prepared to give the Maoists a chance.
The contribution of anthropology
What is so specific or special about an anthropological perspective? How
might it contribute to a particular understanding of an election?
Our greatest contribution, I suggest, lies in our detailed, long-term
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fieldwork; the teasing out and understanding of a specific context and of
how things play out over time in one location (while at the same time
situating these local processes in wider regional, national and interna-
tional contexts). Such work provides indepth know ledge of personal his-
tories, the ongoing complexity of interrelationships, the forming and
re-forming of networks and affiliations, and the subtle shifts in kinship-
based patterns of behaviour.
Our enduring engagement with localities co-exists with a perspective
that challenges the taken-for-granted, and struggles to understand the
contested, nuanced and contradictory complexity of everyday life. This
standpoint provides the possibility for insights that are entirely different
to those of a short-term election observer, a human rights worker who
visits to document an atrocity, or a researcher who arrives to administer
a survey. In-depth local knowledge and long-term observation are essen-
tial to explaining why what has happened has happened. Short-term meth-
odologies and fleeting visits will not access these processes. In these
conceptualisations, there is the danger that Thagu becomes merely 'a
Maoist'. The detailed process, sequence of events, interrelationships, shift-
ing affiliations and specific personal journey which led a thoughtful 35-
year-old Tamu farmer to become a member of the ePN (Maoist) will be
bypassed, and with it much of the complexity of how the Maoist move-
ment has worked in rural Nepal.
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